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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1804 
___________ 
 
FREDERICK  OF THE FAMILY GONORA, 
                                        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES; MONMOUTH COUNTY NEW JERSEY; 
MONMOUTH COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR; MONMOUTH COUNTY BOARD OF 
CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS; MONMOUTH COUNTY DIVISION OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES; MONMOUTH COUNTY CLERK OF  COURT; ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE OF THE COURTS AND THE DIVISION OF FAMILY DEVELOPMENT; 
FAMILY DIVISION; MONMOUTH COUNTY CHANCERY DIVISION FAMILY 
PART JUDGES; MONMOUTH COUNTY FAMILY COURT AND PROBATION 
DIVISION; MONMOUTH COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-18-cv-03793) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 5, 2019 
Before:  KRAUSE, SCIRICA, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  July 24, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
Frederick Gonora appeals the District Court’s order, abstaining from exercising 
jurisdiction and dismissing Gonora’s civil rights action.  We will affirm.  
Gonora filed his amended complaint, alleging various violations of his civil rights 
by the Office of Child Support Services (OCSS) and Monmouth County, among others.  
Specifically, Gonora appeared to challenge the services provided by the Child Support 
Enforcement Program, Title IV-D, 42 U.S.C. § 651, et seq., an administrative program 
that helps enforce child support orders.  OCSS and Monmouth County ultimately filed 
motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).   
The District Court held that Gonora’s claims were barred by the Younger 
abstention doctrine.1  Applying this Court’s reasoning in Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 
412 (3d Cir. 2003), the District Court held that the requirements for Younger abstention 
were met because Gonora’s child support obligations were part of an ongoing state court 
proceeding.  Thus, the District Court abstained from exercising jurisdiction and dismissed 
the case.  Gonora timely appealed. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292.  We review the legal 
determinations of whether the requirements for Younger abstention have been met de 
novo.  Anthony, 316 F.3d at 417.  “If the requirements have been met, we review [a] 
district court’s decision to abstain for abuse of discretion.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
                                              
1 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
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The Younger abstention doctrine directs district courts to “abstain from exercising 
jurisdiction over a particular claim where resolution of that claim in federal court would 
offend principles of comity by interfering with an ongoing state proceeding.”  Lazaridis 
v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010).  A district court appropriately abstains 
pursuant to Younger if: “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in 
nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state 
proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.”  Id.  However, 
even if these requirements are met, Younger abstention is not appropriate if the federal 
plaintiff can establish that (1) the state court proceedings are being “undertaken in bad 
faith or for purposes of harassment” or (2) some other extraordinary circumstance exists.  
Id. at 670 n.4. 
Here, the District Court correctly applied our holding in Anthony and determined 
that the requirements for abstention were met.  While the amended complaint is not a 
model of clarity, Gonora’s claims referenced ongoing proceedings in New Jersey state 
court related to the enforcement of child support.  See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 8, 20, 21, 54.  
Given the nature of child support orders, the District Court correctly recognized Anthony 
as controlling and concluded that the first two requirements of the Younger test were 
satisfied.  See Anthony, 316 F.3d at 419–21 (holding child support orders require 
continuous involvement by New Jersey courts and that New Jersey has an important state 
interest in ordering, monitoring, enforcing, and modifying child support obligations).  As 
to the third requirement, “the burden on this point rests on [Gonora] to show that state 
procedural law barred presentation of [his] claims.”  Id. at 422.  Gonora did not offer any 
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legitimate reason why he could not raise his claims in the New Jersey state court system, 
and therefore this requirement is satisfied.  See id. (noting the various ways child support 
obligors are free to raise their claims in the New Jersey state court system).   
On appeal, Gonora argues that the Younger abstention doctrine was incorrectly 
applied because it is “identical” to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.2  Appellant’s Br. 4.  
Gonora also suggests that the matters he is referring to are not judicial in nature, because 
the “organizations involved are compelled to abide with a Federal Contract with the US 
Dept of Health and Human Services under 31 U.S.C. § 6305 and 45 CFR § 302.34.”  
Appellant’s Br. 5.  However, in his reply brief, Gonora forecloses any doubt as to the 
applicability of Younger or the judicial nature of the underlying claims by specifically 
noting the docket number of the New Jersey family court proceedings.3  See Appellant’s 
Reply Br. 1.  Accordingly, the District Court correctly applied the Younger abstention 
doctrine.  Furthermore, as Gonora fails to point to any harassment or other extraordinary 
circumstance in this case which might make abstention inappropriate, we cannot 
conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in abstaining from exercising 
                                              
2 Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 
U.S. 462 (1983).  In addition to being an incorrect characterization of these two doctrines, 
see, e.g., Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d 
Cir. 2010), Gonora fails to elaborate why—and we do not see why—any similarity 
between the two doctrines would preclude the application of Younger here. 
 
3 He also references the various orders that have been issued over the years—further 
indicating the ongoing nature of the child support matters with which he is involved.  
Appellant’s Reply Br. 1. 
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jurisdiction.4  See Anthony, 316 F.3d at 417. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
                                              
4 Gonora suggests that the “New Jersey Judiciary is acting in [b]ad faith by [v]iolating the 
Separation of Powers Doctrine.”  Appellant’s Br. 4.  He does not elaborate on this 
argument, which he is making for the first time on appeal, and we therefore decline to 
consider it as a ground for reversing the decision of the District Court.  See Barna v. Bd. 
of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting 
we have consistently refused to consider ill-developed arguments or those not properly 
discussed on appeal); Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 65 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“We generally do not address arguments that were not made in the district court and we 
therefore decline to consider the appellants’ current argument as a ground for reversing 
the decision of the district court.”). 
